Because I said so, okay?: Permissible paternalism in liberal democratic theory
LE3 .A278 2011
2011
Pyrcz, Greg
Acadia University
Bachelor of Arts
Honours
Political Science
Politics
While the general trend of liberal democracies over the past two and a half thousand years has been to increase the liberties of citizens, there is cause for concern that these increases may not be absolute or defensible. When modern governments have no plan for how they might accommodate, or limit, individual freedoms, abuses of same are sure to follow. The problem of paternalism, or of substituting one‟s judgment for that of another, is therefore of increasing importance in modern liberal democratic societies. Foundational political theorists, such as John Stuart Mill, have traditionally defined a broad scope for individual liberty vis a vis the state. However, it can be shown that this wide, libertarian sphere is not always congruent with contemporary societies and their circumstances. Many conceptions of paternalism are either too broad and allow more freedom than modern states can tolerate, or are too narrow and more closely resemble the policies adopted by totalitarian or monarchic regimes. And others still are incoherent when followed to their logical conclusions. Far from rendering the concept of paternalism obsolete, these problems highlight the necessity for a modern, coherent, applicable definition for the acceptable constraint of individual liberty. The definitions proposed by several theorists are examined, and those parts that might be considered congruent with contemporary liberal states are unified and augmented to create a new definition for what is, in the end, a very new concept; rational patruism is the modern incarnation of an old, yet necessary, political theory.
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https://scholar.acadiau.ca/islandora/object/theses:807