Epistemic humility and evidential arguments from evil

Anderson, D. J. (2005). Epistemic humility and evidential arguments from evil. https://scholar.acadiau.ca/islandora/object/theses:449

Title: Epistemic humility and evidential arguments from evil
Author: Anderson, David J.
Call Number: LE3 .A278 2005
Date: 2005
Supervisor: Wilks, Ian
Degree Grantor: Acadia University
Degree Name: Bachelor of Arts
Degree Level: Honours
Discipline: Philosophy
Affiliation: Philosophy
Abstract: Evidential arguments from evil (for atheism) have been the focus of much attention in contemporary philosophy of religion. I begin by closely examining the very influential early arguments of William Rowe. Stephen Wykstra proposes a condition Rowe's argument must meet, which he labels CORNEA. After explicating and defending CORNEA, I endeavor to show that a recognition of our cognitive limitations (through a position I label 'epistemic humility' keeps Rowe's argument from satisfying the condition and hence keeps it from ultimately succeeding. I consider and reject a very recent objection to the arguments I endorse and then conclude by distinguishing those arguments from the position known as 'skeptical theism'.
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Permanent Link: https://scholar.acadiau.ca/islandora/object/theses:449

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