Epistemic humility and evidential arguments from evil
LE3 .A278 2005
2005
Wilks, Ian
Acadia University
Bachelor of Arts
Honours
Philosophy
Evidential arguments from evil (for atheism) have been the focus of much attention in contemporary philosophy of religion. I begin by closely examining the very influential early arguments of William Rowe. Stephen Wykstra proposes a condition Rowe's argument must meet, which he labels CORNEA. After explicating and defending CORNEA, I endeavor to show that a recognition of our cognitive limitations (through a position I label 'epistemic humility' keeps Rowe's argument from satisfying the condition and hence keeps it from ultimately succeeding. I consider and reject a very recent objection to the arguments I endorse and then conclude by distinguishing those arguments from the position known as 'skeptical theism'.
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https://scholar.acadiau.ca/islandora/object/theses:449