LE3 .A278 2009

2009

Brackney, William

Acadia University

Master of Arts

Masters

Theology

Acadia Divinity College

In philosophical and theological discourse alike, the God of theism is traditionally understood to be perfectly good or omnibenevolent: a belief known as agatheism. This assignation of the attribute of goodness is typically assumed to imply God’s moral perfection. Part I briefly discusses this philosophical development, and then explores the nature of morality, arriving at a workable model of moral perfection. However, in Part II, it is demonstrated that such a moral understanding of divine goodness raises some insurmountable problems for theism, including the logical and evidential problems of evil, and the moral argument for atheism. Furthermore, the moral arguments for theism, advanced by some prominent thinkers, are of no help in rescuing moral agatheism. Consequently, if the positive belief in agatheism is to be retained, and not merely abandoned in favor of an assertion of mystery, the theist must discard the moral understanding of agatheism and identify some alternative human concept, which both warrants the name of ‘ goodness’ and renders agatheism at least partially intelligible. Accordingly, in Part III, a case is made for an alternative account of agatheism, based on Christianity’s relational understanding of God’s completely self- giving, other- affirming love ( i. e. agape).

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https://scholar.acadiau.ca/islandora/object/theses:131